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PRIVATIZING AND PUBLICIZING SPEECH 
Nelson Tebbe* 
I. 
When should we allow governments to deploy private-law rules in or-
der to circumvent public-law obligations?  Two cases this year call that 
question to mind.  They ask the Supreme Court to explore interactions be-
tween property law and constitutional rules concerning free speech and an-
tiestablishment. 
On the one hand, the Court recently handed down Pleasant Grove City 
v. Summum, which involved a Ten Commandments monument that a pri-
vate religious organization donated to a city.1  The Court concluded that the 
permanent monument became government speech when the city accepted 
the gift, displayed it in a municipal park, and formally took ownership of 
the monument itself.2  The Justices therefore turned away a free speech 
challenge brought by Summum, a minority faith that wanted the city to dis-
play its monument—The Seven Aphorisms of Summum—alongside the 
Ten Commandments.  Finding the existing monument constituted govern-
ment speech allowed the Court to dismiss Summum’s claim that municipal 
officials selectively opened the parkland to only certain types of private sec-
tarian speech in violation of the First Amendment.  The Court reasoned that 
Pleasant Grove could exclude Summum’s monument because when the 
government itself speaks, it can select its message without giving equal air-
time to other perspectives.3  (Of course government endorsement of the Ten 
Commandments raised obvious antiestablishment questions, which the 
Court did not consider because of the way the case was litigated, as I will 
 
 
 
*
  Associate Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School.  J.D., Yale Law School; Ph.D., University of 
Chicago.  Thanks to Michael Cahill, Edward Janger, Christopher Serkin, and participants in the Brook-
lyn Law School Junior Faculty Colloquium for helpful discussions on this piece and related themes.  Fi-
nally, to Christopher Lund for inviting me to join this conversation. 
1
  Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 129 S.Ct. 1125, 1129 (2009) (link). 
2
  Id.  The fact that the city formally acquired the monument figured into the Court’s conclusion that 
the Ten Commandments constituted government speech, although ownership was not the only factor.  
See id. at 1134 (reasoning that ―[t]he City has selected those monuments that it wants to display . . . ; it 
has taken ownership of most of the monuments in the Park, including the Ten Commandments monu-
ment that is the focus of respondent’s concern; and the City has now expressly set forth the criteria it 
will use in making future selections‖); see also id. (―[T]he City took ownership of that monument and 
put it on permanent display in a park that it owns and manages . . . .  All rights previously possessed by 
the monument’s donor have been relinquished.‖). 
3
  For a limited defense of selective exclusion of religious perspectives from government speech, see 
Nelson Tebbe, Excluding Religion, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1263, 1297–1300 (2008) (link). 
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explain.4)  You can think of the city’s decision to accept, display, and ac-
quire the Ten Commandments monument as the opposite of privatization—
it ―publicized‖ a sectarian symbol, both in the sense that it formally took 
title to the display and in that it used public property to broadcast the mes-
sage. 
On the other hand, consider Salazar v. Buono, which the Court will 
hear in the fall.  It concerns a white cross that has long stood in the Mojave 
National Preserve.5  After a lower court ruled that the cross was an uncons-
titutional establishment,6 Congress intervened and conveyed the small par-
cel of land containing the cross to a private organization.7  Privatizing the 
speech was meant to quell antiestablishment concerns by disassociating the 
federal government from the sectarian message.  Yet Congress retained ties 
to the land, including a property interest and certain regulatory power.8  The 
transaction’s highly structured nature left the federal government open to 
charges of ventriloquism—using a private party to convey what essentially 
remained a government message.9 
Moreover, to the extent that Congress succeeded in privatizing the 
cross, it became vulnerable to just the sort of free speech objection that the 
government in Summum successfully evaded by publicizing the sectarian 
monument.  In fact, another religious group—a Buddhist organization—
initially sparked the controversy over the white cross when it wrote to the 
National Park Service and requested permission to display its monuments 
nearby.  Although the Buddhists never brought legal action, it is not totally 
inconceivable to imagine them arguing today that once Congress has agreed 
to privatize one form of sectarian speech, it has a constitutional obligation 
to offer such deals to all private speakers on equal terms.  As things turned 
out, however, only one constitutional issue is before the Court—the anties-
tablishment request to undo the privatizing transaction—and the govern-
ment’s evasion of that claim is likely to succeed, at least in the short term. 
One of these cases, then, asks whether government can avoid a consti-
tutional difficulty by publicizing private sectarian speech, while the other 
asks whether government can evade a different constitutional problem by 
privatizing such expression.  Both cases present their issues in the context 
 
 
 
4
  Cf. Editorial, A Case of Religious Discrimination, NYTIMES.COM, Nov. 11, 2008, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/12/opinion/12wed1.html?_r=3 (arguing that the Supreme Court 
should address the Establishment Clause issue) (link). 
5
  Buono v. Kempthorne, 527 F.3d 758 (9th Cir. 2008) [―Buono IV‖] (link), cert. granted sub nom. 
Salazar v. Buono, 129 S. Ct. 1313 (2009) (link). 
6
  Buono v. Norton, 212 F. Supp. 2d 1202, 1217 (C.D. Cal. 2002) [―Buono I‖] (link). 
7
  Kempthorne, 527 F.3d at 771 (citing Pub. L. No. 108-87 § 8121 (a)–(f), 117 Stat. 1100 (2003), co-
dified at 16 U.S.C. § 410aaa–56 (note)). 
8
  For a detailed description of the transaction, see infra Part II.B. 
9
  For another example of a government sale of real property to deflect a religious freedom chal-
lenge, see Paulson v. City of San Diego, 475 F.3d 1047, 1048 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding that a state con-
stitutional challenge was mooted when the city transferred property containing a cross to the federal 
government, which is not bound by the state constitution) (link).  
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of government stewardship over its property, specifically real property that 
it has opened up to the public as parkland.  Both involve government eva-
sion of one constitutional question in a way that may raise a countervailing 
constitutional difficulty.  And both will probably be resolved in favor of the 
government on the ground that it has successfully insulated itself from a 
constitutional challenge through actions involving a property transfer.  
(Summum already has been decided that way).  Most generally, then, both 
cases concern the interrelationship between private-law arrangements and 
public-law obligations. 
Differences separate the cases, of course.  Most obviously, Summum 
was litigated exclusively as a speech case, whereas Buono presents only an 
antiestablishment question.  Moreover, one concerns a locality, while the 
other challenges the federal government.  Nevertheless, they can profitably 
be thought through together.  Juxtaposing them may teach us something 
about government privatization and publicization of sectarian speech. 
One question is whether the outcome of each case is correct (assuming 
I have accurately predicted the result in Buono).  What people think about 
that will depend on their underlying theories of antiestablishment and free-
dom of speech.  Some may focus on citizens’ autonomy around matters of 
conscience and expression, while others may prioritize evenhandedness to-
ward sects or viewpoints.  Yet apart from the outcome question, there is the 
matter of whether straightforward application of property rules to these cas-
es adequately serves the constitutional values at play.  Does saying that a 
city’s acquisition of a sectarian monument effectively renders its message 
government speech, thereby putting it beyond the reach of the Speech 
Clause, capture everything the First Amendment either permits or requires?  
Does it satisfy public principles to say that Congress can manage its Estab-
lishment Clause obligations by means of a sophisticated land transaction 
that formally privatizes the religious symbol?  In short, are courts asking the 
right questions? 
 
II. 
A. 
Before exploring these questions further, we need to understand certain 
details of each case.  Summum concerned Pleasant Grove City, Utah, which 
maintains a park in the historic district of town.10  Within the park are nu-
merous permanent monuments or displays, including a granite representa-
tion of the Ten Commandments.  Like many of the objects in the park, the 
Ten Commandments monument was donated by a private organization, the 
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  Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125, 1129 (2009). 
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Fraternal Order of Eagles.11  (Interestingly, this is the same organization that 
donated the tablets upheld in Van Orden v. Perry.12) 
Controversy erupted when Summum, a small religious group founded 
in 1975 and headquartered in Salt Lake City, contacted Pleasant Grove offi-
cials and requested permission to erect its own monument alongside the ex-
isting ones.13  Like the Ten Commandments monument, the ―Seven Aphor-
Aphorisms of SUMMUM‖ would have been made of stone and would have 
been a similar size and shape.14  After the city denied the request, stating 
that the park was reserved for monuments that either related to the history 
of the town or were donated by groups with ―longstanding ties‖ to the local 
community, Summum filed suit. 
Critically, Summum did not seek to have the existing monument re-
moved, but instead sought to have its Seven Aphorisms included in the 
park.  Accordingly, the group did not bring an Establishment Clause chal-
lenge, which might have resulted in exclusion of both monuments, but in-
stead claimed only that the town’s policy abridged its rights under the Free 
Speech Clause.  It argued that Pleasant Grove had opened the park to cer-
tain forms of private speech, and, having done so, the city could not then 
exclude other private speech in a discriminatory way.  That made sense, 
again, because the relief Summum sought was to have its display included, 
not to have the Ten Commandments banned from the park.  Yet framing the 
case that way meant that it would be litigated in a strange posture, under 
which only the speech aspects of the case could be considered.  Nothing 
about the Court’s rationale would be specific to religion or religious speech.  
All of that was perfectly fine with Pleasant Grove, of course, which could 
then defend against the speech claim by arguing that the existing monument 
constituted government speech, without having to worry—at least in this lit-
igation—about the antiestablishment ramifications of that argument.15 
Earlier this year, the Supreme Court ruled unanimously against Sum-
mum.16  Justice Alito’s majority opinion used straightforward logic. Simply 
put, the Speech Clause ―has no application‖ to government speech.17  When 
Pleasant Grove accepted the permanent monument and displayed it on pub-
 
 
 
11
  Id. 
12
  545 U.S. 677 (2005) (plurality opinion) (upholding a Ten Commandments display on the grounds 
of the Texas state capitol) (link).  See id. at 682.   
13
  Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 1129–30. 
14
  Id. 
15
  In all likelihood, an antiestablishment challenge to the Pleasant Grove Ten Commandments mo-
nument would not succeed in the Supreme Court.  Cf. Van Orden, 545 U.S. 677 (upholding a similar 
display that was likewise surrounded by an array of other monuments).  An earlier antiestablishment 
challenge had been withdrawn by the plaintiffs, presumably after a calculation that it would be unlikely 
to succeed because of Van Orden.  See Christopher C. Lund, Keeping the Government’s Religion Pure: 
Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 104 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 46 (2009), 
http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/colloquy/2009/28/LRColl2009n28Lund.pdf (link). 
16
  Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125. 
17
  Id. at 1131. 
104:70  (2009) Privatizing and Publicizing Speech 
http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/colloquy/2009/30/ 74 
lic property, the Ten Commandments message became government 
speech.18  Therefore, the free speech challenge could not succeed. 
Now, the Court did acknowledge that other limits constrain govern-
ment speech, notably the rule against government establishment of reli-
gion.19  And it recognized that the Speech Clause limits the ability of 
officials to regulate private speech on government property.20  However, 
neither of those limits was applicable because, again, no antiestablishment 
claim had been brought and the Ten Commandments monument did not 
constitute private speech. 
One aspect of the decision deserves mention, because it anticipated 
Buono.  Justice Alito defended the proposition that permanent monuments 
on public property constitute government speech by reference to routine ob-
servers.  People who view permanent displays typically and reasonably as-
sume that they convey the views of the landowner, who accepts and 
displays them selectively.21  That assumption holds whether or not the mo-
numents themselves are owned by private donors, and whether or not they 
stand on public or private land.  So the Court suggested that it will not 
simply defer to every private-law arrangement—ownership of the monu-
ment itself is not the only factor that matters when the Court determines 
who is speaking.  That suggestion will be drawn out and tested in Buono, 
where the Court will confront a land transaction that is highly structured, so 
that ordinary observers may not be able to associate the message of a per-
manent monument with the property owner. 
 
B. 
At the center of the Buono case is a white cross that has long stood in 
the wilderness of the Mojave National Preserve in southeastern California.22  
Because it sits on an elevated outcropping called ―Sunrise Rock,‖ the cross 
is visible from a distance, including from a road that passes through the 
Preserve about 100 yards away.23  A private organization, the Veterans of 
 
 
 
18
  Id. at 1134. 
19
  Id. at 1131–32. 
20
  Id. at 1132. 
21
  Id. at 1133 (―[P]ersons who observe donated [permanent] monuments routinely—and reasona-
bly—interpret them as conveying some message on the property owner’s behalf . . . .  This is true 
whether the monument is located on private property or on public property, such as national, state, or 
city park land.‖).  The Court also noted that Pleasant Grove had taken ownership of the Ten Command-
ment monument and most other monuments in the Park, so that all rights of ownership were transferred 
from the private donor to the government, though its analysis does not seem to turn on this fact.  Id. at 
1134. 
22
  For an image of the cross, as well as a description and brief historical account, see ERIC CHARLES 
NYSTROM, FROM NEGLECTED SPACE TO PRIVATE PLACE: AN ADMINISTRATIVE HISTORY OF MOJAVE 
NATIONAL PRESERVE Ch. 6 (Mar. 2003), http://www.nps.gov/archive/moja/adminhist/adhi6.htm (link).  
23
  Buono IV, 527 F.3d 758, 769 (9th Cir. 2008), cert. granted sub nom. Salazar v. Buono, 129 S. Ct. 
1313 (2009). 
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Foreign Wars (VFW), erected the cross in 1934, reportedly to commemo-
rate the sacrifices of American soldiers who had given their lives in World 
War I.24  No evidence suggests that the VFW ever received permission from 
the federal government, which owns and manages the land, to erect the 
original cross.  Nor did the government apparently sanction the several re-
placement crosses that private parties from time to time put in place as the 
existing structure weathered.  In recent years, the cross has been used for 
Easter religious services.25 
As in Summum, attention was first drawn to the religious symbol not 
by separationists seeking to have the cross removed, but by a minority reli-
gious group that asked to have its symbol displayed alongside the existing 
one.  In both cases, the complaint was against government exclusion of 
smaller faiths, not against official inclusion of Christianity.  That raises in-
teresting questions about the core function of the constitutional rule against 
establishments, of course, but I will leave those issues to one side for the 
moment.  In Buono, it was a Buddhist group that sought permission to build 
a stupa on another outcropping near Sunrise Rock.  Permission was denied 
by the federal government, which also said that it planned to remove the 
cross.26 
Congress caught wind of what was happening and began passing legis-
lation.  First, it prohibited federal money from being used to remove the 
cross.27  Next, Congress designated the cross as a national memorial and ap-
propriated up to $10,000 that would be used to acquire and install a replica 
of a plaque that had accompanied the original 1934 cross.28  National me-
morial status meant, in part, that the federal government would now ―super-
vis[e], manage[], and control‖ the cross—presumably even after transfer to 
private ownership.29 
Meanwhile, a federal district court ruled in a lawsuit brought by the 
ACLU that the cross constituted an unconstitutional establishment of reli-
gion and entered a permanent injunction prohibiting the federal government 
 
 
 
24
  Id. 
25
  Id. 
26
  Id.  The National Park Service conducted a study and concluded that the cross did not qualify for 
historic preservation status, partly because worship services were regularly conducted there, and the 
NPS announced its intention to remove the cross.  Id. 
27
  Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2001, Pub. L. No. 106-554 app. D § 133, 114 Stat. 2763A-230 
(link). Later, Congress passed another piece of legislation prohibiting federal funds from being used to 
dismantle the monument.  Kempthorne, 527 F.3d at 771 (citing Pub. L. No. 107-248 & 8065(b), 116 
Stat. 1551 (2002)). 
28
  Id. at 770.  The plaque, which was shown in historical photographs, read: ―The Cross, Erected in 
Memory of the Dead of All Wars,‖ and ―Erected 1934 by Members of Veterans of Foregin [sic] Wars, 
Death Valley post 2884.‖  Id. at 769. 
29
  Id. at 771. 
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from ―permitting display of the . . . cross . . . .‖30  A panel of the Ninth Cir-
cuit affirmed.31  While the appeal was pending, the cross was covered with a 
plywood box, which presumably remains in place today as the case awaits 
final resolution in the Supreme Court.32   
Lawmakers then took the step that lies at the heart of the case. Faced 
with the federal court injunction, Congress decided to transfer the one-acre 
plot of land containing the cross into private hands. It passed a law convey-
ing title to the plot to the VFW in exchange for another parcel of land of 
equal or greater value.33  The action was an obvious effort to moot the con-
stitutional challenge by removing government ownership or endorsement of 
the religious symbol. 
Importantly, however, the federal government retained certain ties to 
the white cross.  Congress clarified, for instance, that officials would con-
tinue to carry out their responsibilities under the law designating the cross a 
national memorial.  Those duties presumably included both general care 
and oversight over the national memorial, as well as the obligation to erect 
a replica plaque using government funds.34  Moreover—and critically—
Congress retained a property interest in the land.  The VFW would take the 
land only on the condition that it would be used as a World War I memori-
al, and that if that condition were ever violated, ownership of the property 
would return to the United States.35  Of course, Congress did not specifical-
ly require the VFW to pay tribute to veterans of that war using a cross, but 
presumably that was only because such a specific requirement would have 
raised an obvious constitutional difficulty. 
ACLU lawyers filed a motion in district court seeking a declaration ei-
ther that the land exchange violated the permanent injunction or that it con-
stituted an independent violation of the Establishment Clause.  The court 
granted the motion to enforce its injunction, and a panel of the Ninth Circuit 
affirmed.36  A petition for rehearing en banc was denied over a strong dis-
 
 
 
30
  Id. at 770.  See also Press Release, ACLU, ACLU Sues Federal Government over Christian Cross 
in Mojave National Preserve (Mar. 22, 2001), available at  
http://www.aclu.org/religion/discrim/16319prs20010322.html (link).  
31
  Buono v. Norton, 371 F.3d 543 (9th Cir. 2004) [―Buono II‖]. 
32
  See Steve Brown, Faith Under Fire in the Desert, THESUNRUNNER.COM, Dec. 2006–Jan. 2007, 
http://www.thesunrunner.com/Stories/Faith_Under_Fire_in_the_Desert/faith_under_fire_in_the_desert.
html (link). 
33
  Not coincidentally, the five-acre parcel of land adjacent to the Preserve was conveyed to the fed-
eral government by Henry Sandoz.  Department of Defense Appropriation Act, 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-
87 § 8121(b), 117 Stat. 1100 (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 410aaa-56 note, 431 note (2006)) (link).  This is 
the same Mr. Sandoz who designed and erected the current version of the cross in 1998.  See Buono IV, 
527 F.3d at 769. 
34
  ―Notwithstanding the conveyance of the property under this subsection, the Secretary [of the Inte-
rior] shall continue to carry out the responsibilities of the Secretary under such section 8137.‖ § 8121(a), 
117 Stat. at 1100. 
35
  § 8121(e), 117 Stat. at 1100.  
36
  Buono IV, 527 F.3d at 768. 
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sent by Judge O’Scannlain and four others.37  Certiorari was granted and the 
case was set for oral argument in the fall of 2009.38 
 
III. 
So when should we allow governments to deploy private-law rules to 
circumvent public-law obligations?  Buono is the more interesting of the 
two cases in this regard.  There, again, Congress crafted a highly structured 
property transaction in order to avoid a court ruling that the white cross 
constituted an establishment.  Reasonably, the lower courts concluded that 
this private-law transfer was impermissible subterfuge designed to avoid a 
violation of public law.39   
Subterfuge for what?  At least two possibilities exist.  First, the trans-
action might obscure a straightforward antiestablishment difficulty, like the 
one that the first Buono court found and ordered the government to reme-
dy.40  Arguably, that violation continues even after the real estate transac-
tion because observers passing through the Preserve may still conclude that 
the white cross sits on federal property and conveys a government message.  
That is one reason why courts might question a government’s attempt to 
moot a constitutional challenge by way of the common law.   
Ordering the government to unwind a real estate transaction would be 
unusual, and yet it might be the best way to rectify the constitutional prob-
lem, understood in this first way.  While governments have taken other 
steps to remedy a mistaken impression of public ownership—say, fencing 
off the private area and posting signs that identify it as private land41—that 
sort of fix is not likely to work in the Buono setting. After all, the white 
cross is meant to be viewed from afar, specifically from a road that winds 
through the Preserve and passes by the monument at a distance of 100 
yards.42  From that vantage point, fencing and signage are not likely to suc-
cessfully differentiate public and private land.  If Congress’s land transfer is 
masking an Establishment Clause violation, removal of the cross may be 
the only effective remedy.  That is precisely the remedy the Ninth Circuit 
ordered.43   
 
 
 
37
  Id. at 760 (O’Scannlain, J., dissenting). 
38
  Salazar v. Buono, 129 S. Ct. 1313 (2009). 
39
  See Buono IV, 527 F.3d at 768 (panel opinion). 
40
  Buono I, 212 F. Supp. 2d 1202, 1217 (C.D. Cal. 2002). 
41
  See, e.g., Freedom from Religion Found., Inc. v. Marshfield, No. 98-C-270-S, 2000 WL 767376, 
at **1–2 (W.D. Wis. May 9, 2000) (ordering a government to fence off a parcel of land containing a sta-
tue of Jesus, following a sale of the parcel to a private entity). 
42
  Buono IV, 527 F.3d at 769. 
43
  Id. at 768.  In this regard, the form of the original district court order is interesting.  It prohibited 
the federal government from ―permitting display of the Latin cross,‖ something that could be read to re-
quire officials to take affirmative action to prohibit private parties from displaying the cross even after a 
land transaction.  Id. at 770. 
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Considerations like these were raised in Justice Souter’s concurrence in 
Summum.  He resisted an easy association between public ownership or 
maintenance of permanent monuments and government speech.  He im-
agined situations in which donated displays could begin to take on the cha-
racteristics of private speech.  If a town or city felt compelled to avoid an 
Establishment Clause problem by surrounding a religious display with other 
donated memorials or testimonials—in order to dilute the sectarian mes-
sage—a suspicion might be raised that some of the objects did not really 
convey government messages.44  ―[T]here are circumstances,‖ he explained, 
―in which government maintenance of monuments does not look like gov-
ernment speech at all.‖45  As in Buono, there may also be reasons to doubt 
whether a contract transferring property ownership to a private entity will 
effectively sever the semantic association between the government and the 
ostensibly privatized message.  Quite possibly, constitutional considerations 
would require courts to qualify—or even unwind—private-law arrange-
ments that work to frustrate public-law commitments. 
There is a second way to understand Congress’s ruse, namely as a ma-
neuver designed to deflect any suspicion that the government has opened its 
parkland to private sectarian speech.  On this second reading of Buono, the 
legislature would be seeking to manage not the Establishment Clause, but 
the Speech Clause and possibly the free exercise guarantee.  After all, the 
Buddhist group that petitioned the National Park Service for permission to 
display its stupa alongside the white cross may well have thought that the 
federal government had authorized the VFW to display its symbol.  If so, 
the Buddhist group may simply have been seeking equal treatment.46  
Viewed that way, the underlying constitutional difficulty becomes quite dif-
ferent, as does the remedy necessary to address it.  Now the trouble is that 
park officials have allowed only certain private expression to take place on 
public land—in other words, they have discriminated on the basis of con-
tent or viewpoint in a way that presumptively contravenes the speech guar-
antee.  Moreover, federal officials could face a religion-specific challenge, 
namely that they have violated the longstanding prohibition of discrimina-
tion against religious sects or denominations.47   
One remedy for this second sort of wrongdoing would be to require 
Congress to make its special land transfer mechanism available to any pri-
vate organization that wishes to display its symbol within the general boun-
daries of the Preserve, so long as it is willing to compensate the government 
for a plot of land (and perhaps be subjected to certain neutral restrictions 
 
 
 
44
  Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125, 1141–42 (2009) (Souter, J., concurring). 
45
  Id. at 1142.  
46
  Buono IV, 527 F.3d at 769 (describing the Buddhist group’s request). 
47
  See, e.g., Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 244 (1982) (―The clearest command of the Establish-
ment Clause is that one religious denomination cannot be officially preferred over another.‖) (link). 
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concerning the amount of land available and similar considerations).48  This 
could be considered the opposite of condemnation—perhaps ―transferna-
tion.‖  Instead of a forced transfer of property from a private entity to the 
government for compensation, this would be a forced transfer of property 
from the government to a private entity for compensation.  
Now of course it might not be wise or feasible to require the federal 
government to transfer land in order to remedy a constitutional violation, 
but the government has another option.  Whenever it faces a finding that it 
has made its facilities available to speech in a discriminatory fashion, it al-
ways has the choice of shutting down the forum altogether.  Here, if the Na-
tional Park Service does not want to offer privatization deals to all sects on 
the same terms, it could simply reverse the VFW deal—using its power of 
eminent domain, if necessary—and remove the cross. 
While it is not completely fanciful to imagine that the federal govern-
ment would agree to allow other groups to display permanent monuments, 
it is certainly unlikely.  After all, the Mojave National Preserve comprises a 
massive territory that could easily accommodate a variety of private monu-
ments representing a variety of perspectives—something that presumably 
would not have been possible in Pleasant Grove’s much smaller park.  Inte-
restingly, if federal officials continued to structure these deals as land ex-
changes, they could maintain or even increase the overall acreage of the 
Preserve. 
 
IV. 
Questioning the power of property or contract rules to manage consti-
tutional difficulties raises issues that are deeper and more widespread con-
cerning the relationship between the government’s private-law 
arrangements and its obligations under public law.  Court decisions regard-
ing such arrangements cut across substantive fields and, considered togeth-
er, can appear patternless.  Sometimes judges look through private-law 
forms to enforce substantive constitutional law, while other times they defer 
rather readily to such mechanisms.  Given this variation, there is a danger 
that government actors will not think they have reason to pause before 
structuring transactions in order to circumvent public obligations.  Buono in 
particular could be viewed as an illustration of that danger. 
An example of the judiciary looking past private-law forms is Alleghe-
ny County v. Greater Pittsburgh ACLU,49 where the Court stuck down a 
crèche displayed during the holiday season on the county courthouse even 
though a sign informed onlookers that the nativity scene had been do-
 
 
 
48
  I am thinking of an equivalent of time, place, and manner restrictions for permanent monuments.  
Another remedy might be to allow the government to unwind the property transaction and then welcome 
a variety of private organizations to display monuments on the land.  Of course, that would work here 
only if the resulting forum sufficiently disassociated the government from any religious message, so that 
the policy mollified the Ninth Circuit’s Establishment Clause concerns. 
49
  492 U.S. 573 (1989) (link). 
104:70  (2009) Privatizing and Publicizing Speech 
http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/colloquy/2009/30/ 80 
nated—and was still owned—by the Holy Name Society, a private Roman 
Catholic organization.50 While the fact that the government took ownership 
of the display in Summum helped to show that it constituted official speech, 
the fact that the display in Allegheny was privately owned did not disasso-
ciate the government from its message.  The Court has investigated private-
law arrangements across other areas of constitutional law as well.  Think for 
instance of Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, where the racial dis-
crimination of a private restaurant was attributed to the state of Delaware 
because the restaurant leased space in a building publicly owned and oper-
ated by a state agency.51  The Burton Court scrutinized the terms of the 
lease, which set up a special relationship of interdependence between the 
two entities, and emphasized the fact that prominent signs identified the 
building as public property.52  In Shelley v. Kraemer, the Court struck down 
an attempt to use private racial covenants, rather than public ordinances, to 
segregate neighborhoods,53 while the Court in Marsh v. Alabama extended 
constitutional speech protections to expression that occurred in a company 
town.54  Finally, a state that contracted out certain inmate rehabilitation ser-
vices to a religious organization was found to have violated the Establish-
ment Clause even though a private group performed the sectarian 
instruction and inmates ostensibly could choose whether to participate in 
the program.55 
Yet courts have, at times, respected structured transactions across a 
range of constitutional domains.  Consider the state program in Freedom 
from Religion Foundation, Inc. v. McCallum, which outsourced certain 
halfway house services to a private religious organization that relied on re-
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  Id. at 579–80 (opinion of Brennan, J.).   
51
  365 U.S. 715 (1961) (link). 
52
  Id. at 720. 
53
  334 U.S. 1 (1948) (link). 
54
  326 U.S. 501 (1946) (link).  Justice Frankfurter addressed the relation between property law and 
constitutional principles in his concurrence: 
A company-owned town gives rise to a net-work of property relations.  As to these, the 
judicial organ of a State has the final say.  But a company-owned town is a town . . . .  
Title to property as defined by State law controls property relations; it cannot control is-
sues of civil liberties which arise precisely because a company town is a town as well as a 
congeries of property relations.  And similarly the technical distinctions on which a find-
ing of ―trespass‖ so often depends are too tenuous to control decision regarding the scope 
of the vital liberties guaranteed by the Constitution. 
Id. at 510–11 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).  Also pertinent might be Wooley v. Maynard, where the 
Court invalidated a New Hampshire law that required car owners to display a license plate bearing the 
state motto, ―Live Free or Die.‖  430 U.S. 705 (1977) (link).  The Court emphasized that the state was 
requiring display of its message on private property without mentioning that the license plate itself likely 
remained public property.  Id. at 715. 
55
  See Ams. United for Separation of Church & State v. Prison Fellowship Ministries, Inc., 509 F.3d 
406, 424–25 (8th Cir. 2007) (link). 
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ligious teachings to rehabilitate offenders.56  Parolees could choose among a 
variety of halfway houses, some of which were secular, but their parole of-
ficers could also recommend Faith Works, which ―encourage[d] the offend-
er to establish a personal relationship with God through the mediation of 
Jesus Christ.‖57  Judge Posner approved the contractual arrangement, saying 
that the offender’s private choice of programs provided ―insulating materi-
al‖ between government and religion.58  That was so even though the fund-
ing flowed directly to the organization, rather than through the private 
individual, as in the typical school voucher scenario.59  Think too of speech 
cases where Congress required private organizations to segment its opera-
tions—formally and legally—so that lawmakers could fund only speech of 
which it approved without running up against the unconstitutional condi-
tions doctrine.60  A bit farther afield are conservation easements, which al-
low a town to transfer the right to prohibit land development to a nonprofit 
conservation organization.61  Honoring such agreements has been the un-
questioned practice despite the fact that these government transactions can 
enshrine public policy against democratic revision even more effectively 
than legislative entrenchment, a legislative technique that remains disfa-
vored.62 
Some of these contractual arrangements may have properly addressed 
the underlying constitutional concerns, while others may have functioned 
more like gerrymanders that allowed the government to effectively evade 
constitutional limitations.  The point to take from this short piece is that 
constitutional theorists may want to think—in a sustained way, across all 
substantive domains—about the effects of government private-law transac-
tions on public-law obligations.  If it is correct to say that officials are in-
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  324 F.3d 880 (7th Cir. 2003) (link). 
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  Id. at 881. 
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  Id. at 882. 
59
  See, e.g., Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 644–48 (2002) (describing how voucher 
funds are given to the parents of the schoolchildren rather than directly to the schools in which they 
choose to enroll their children) (link). 
60
  Compare FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364 (1984) (striking down a funding re-
striction that prohibited public broadcasting stations from ―editorializing‖) (link), with Rust v. Sullivan, 
500 U.S. 173, 173–74 (1991) (approving a funding restriction that prohibited subsidy of abortion-related 
speech, reasoning in part that organizations remained free to engage in abortion-related communication 
so long as they kept it ―separate and distinct‖ from funded speech) (link). 
61
  See Christopher Serkin, Conservation Easements, U. CHI. L. REV. (forthcoming 2009) (manu-
script on file with author). 
62
  Id.  Interestingly, the private law itself may be less formalistic than public law courts sometimes 
assume it to be.  A variety of doctrines allow courts to put aside contractual arrangements that seem 
fraudulent in one way or another.  Perhaps the most famous of these is the doctrine that permits piercing 
the corporate veil under certain circumstances. Dole Food Co. v. Patrickson, 538 U.S. 468, 475 (2003) 
(―[t]he veil separating corporations and their shareholders may be pierced in some circumstances‖). See 
also, e.g., Edward J. Janger, The Death of Secured Lending, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 1759, 1762–69 (2004) 
(describing the doctrine of ―true sale‖ in property and contract law, under which courts treat a purported 
sale as a loan if the ostensible buyer has not assumed the risks or purchased the benefits of ownership). 
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creasingly resorting to structured transactions, for instance when establish-
ing public/private partnerships or when outsourcing public functions, then it 
may make sense to think more systematically about when and how those ar-
rangements are constitutionally permissible. 
 
 
 
